cotton v fordice

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Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit states from disenfranchising convicted felons. Were this the end of the story, we would be bound by Hunter, which, construing an Alabama provision of similar age and intent, held it violative of equal protection. 1995) (citation omitted). at 976-78.

John Lewis Clay, Special Asst. In Hunter, the State of Alabama argued that its disenfranchising clause was constitutional because each of the obviously discriminatory crimes contained in the original provision had already been struck by the courts. Click the citation to see the full text of the cited case. COTTON v. FORDICE United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). at 1920. Listed below are the cases that are cited in this Featured Case. of Corrections, Parchman, MS, for Defendants-Appellees. See MISS.

The Mississippi Secretary of State was then required to publish a full-text version of § 241, as revised, at least two weeks before the popular election.

97-60275 View Case; Cited Cases; Citing Case ; 157 F.3d 388 (1998) ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The cases linked on your profile facilitate Casemine's artificial intelligence engine in recommending you to potential clients who might be interested in availing your services for similar matters. Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Hunter, however, left open the possibility that by amendment, a facially neutral provision like § 241 might overcome its odious origin.7 That is what has happened here. 1995) (citation omitted). Larceny § 1(2), at 398 (1968)). See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229-31, 105 S.Ct. Section 241, as enacted in 1890, was amended in 1950, removing "burglary" from the list of disenfranchising crimes. denied, 516 U.S. 995, 116 S.Ct. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233, 105 S.Ct. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. Finally, a majority of the voters had to approve the entire provision, including the revision.

See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54, 94 S.Ct. Abstract. Brown argues that because the Mississippi Constitution does not expressly list "armed robbery" as a disenfranchising crime, he has retained the right to vote. Before GARWOOD, JONES and WIENER, Circuit Judges. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232-33, 105 S.Ct. The Mississippi Code labels various theft crimes as larceny,3 receiving stolen property,4 robbery,5 extortion,6 and so forth. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228, 105 S.Ct. Amending § 241 was a deliberative process. Cotton Belt 819 leaves Fordyce, Ar. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). The state defendants do not dispute that § 241 was enacted in an era when southern states discriminated against blacks by disenfranchising convicts for crimes that, it was thought, were committed primarily by blacks. Cotton v. Fordice Year: 1998: Cite: 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. See Hunter 471 U.S. at 228, 105 S.Ct. 97-60275. Appellant next argues that § 241 is unconstitutional because it was originally drafted with the intent to disenfranchise blacks. Once you create your profile, you will be able to: Claim the judgments where you have appeared by linking them directly to your profile and maintain a record of your body of work. Sept. 19, 1996) (district court dismissed case as frivolous). at 44. Mississippi's complicity in this practice was recognized by its Supreme Court six years after the original adoption of § 241. Appellant Keith Brown is serving a sentence for armed robbery in a Mississippi state penitentiary. contains alphabet).

Cotton's appeal, however, was severed and dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F.Supp. Because Mississippi's procedure resulted both in 1950 and in 1968 in a re-enactment of § 241, each amendment superseded the previous provision and removed the discriminatory taint associated with the original version.8. We affirm. 95-60284 (5th Cir.

157 F.3d 388. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir.

568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). 954, 970 n. 18 (S.D.Miss. Williams v. State, 170 U.S. 213, 18 S.Ct. 247, 20 So. Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Aug. 22, 1995)(unpublished)(district court and court of appeals dismissed frivolous counts as two separate strikes); Cotton v. Fordice, No. COTTON v. FORDICE Email | Print | Comments (0) No. Although it appears that the constitutional disqualifying provision originally intended to discriminate against black felons, its recent re-enactment by the people of Mississippi has not been shown to bear that taint. University of California, Davis - School of Law . Once a plaintiff proves that racial discrimination was a motivating factor behind the enactment of the law, "the burden shifts to the law's defenders to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this factor." 954, 970 n. 18 (S.D.Miss.1995) (citation omitted). denied, 516 U.S. 995, 116 S.Ct. Not only did the district court hold that the term "theft" in § 241 includes the crime of "armed robbery"; the court also rejected his alternate contention that the disenfranchising provision is unconstitutional because it was enacted with racially discriminatory motives. Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to show the existence of a material fact. The Alabama alterations, on the other hand, were made through the judicial process of striking certain crimes which had the effect of limiting the coverage of the disenfranchising clause. & passes Harmony Grove, Ar. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 1920 (citing Mt. Although § 241 was facially neutral and technically in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment, the state was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit states from disenfranchising convicted felons. Amending § 241 was a deliberative process. at 976-78. See McLaughlin, 947 F.Supp. at 976-78.

at 977.

Using the same standard on appellate review, all fact questions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and questions of law are reviewed de novo. change. 1950); H. Con. denied 518 U.S. 1025, 116 S.Ct. We also find it persuasive that in Mississippi, larceny (common law theft) is a lesser included offense of robbery. at 976-78. 97-60275 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 157 F.3d 388; 1998 U.S. App. Creating your profile on CaseMine allows you to build your network with fellow lawyers and prospective clients. MISS. 2565, 135 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1996) ("[O]nce the State proved the elements of robbery, it was not required to offer any additional proof to establish the charge of grand larceny."). Thus, for double jeopardy purposes, the relatedness of the crimes is clear. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Id. at 1922. Theft is the "popular term for larceny," BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (6th ed. Similarly, Mississippi defines "larceny" as "taking and carrying away, feloniously, the personal property of another." 532, 133 L.Ed.2d 438 (1995). Sch. at 1920-22; Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. Finally, a majority of the voters had to approve the entire provision, including the revision. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 954, 970 n. 18 (S.D.Miss. at 1920-22; Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. See MISS.CODE ANN. The court's conclusion is persuasive.

MISS. In law, "theft" is a general label for statutorily created crimes involving an unlawful taking. at 977.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. 2655, 2671, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974). 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). 1012 (1898) (finding that § 241 was constitutional because it was facially race neutral). at 228, 105 S.Ct. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233, 105 S.Ct. Healthy City Bd. CODE ANN.

The Mississippi Secretary of State was then required to publish a full-text version of § 241, as revised, at least two weeks before the popular election.

See id. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence sufficient to show the existence of a material fact. Citation. No. Section 241, as enacted in 1890, was amended in 1950, removing "burglary" from the list of disenfranchising crimes. Not only did the district court hold that the term "theft" in § 241 includes the crime of "armed robbery"; the court also rejected his alternate contention that the disenfranchising provision is unconstitutional because it was enacted with racially discriminatory motives. The federal courts' task is to determine as best we can "how [the Mississippi Supreme Court] would rule if the issue were before it." Brown first argues that § 241 does not apply to him because it disenfranchises persons convicted of "theft" and not those convicted of "armed robbery." (15 Oct, 1998) 15 Oct, 1998 P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. Kirk FORDICE, et al., Defendants-Appellees. XII, § 241 (1890). at 868; see also McLaughlin, 947 F. Supp. at 1922.

Hunter, however, left open the possibility that by amendment, a facially neutral provision like § 241 might overcome its odious origin. See id.

See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229-31, 105 S.Ct. The district court held, however, that "armed robbery" is included in Mississippi's definition of "theft" because "robbery is the highest category of theft." MISS.CODE ANN. Brown first argues that § 241 does not apply to him because it disenfranchises persons convicted of "theft" and not those convicted of "armed robbery." Williams v. State, 170 U.S. 213, 18 S.Ct. We also note that Brown offered no evidence, and the state did not concede, that the effect of § 241 is discriminatory against blacks, yet Hunter also requires unconstitutional effects as well as motive. Corp. v. Abraham, 137 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1998). Cf.

Gen., Jane Lanier Mapp, Jackson, MS, Leonard Charlton Vincent, MS Dept.

A district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law is proper if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229-31, 105 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct.

MISS.CODE ANN. Then, in 1968, the state broadened the provision by adding "murder" and "rape" — crimes historically excluded from the list because they were not considered "black" crimes. At least one other court has broadly interpreted § 241 to conclude that "theft" is an "umbrella term" to describe those crimes that involve a "wrongful taking." Because Mississippi's procedure resulted both in 1950 and in 1968 in a re-enactment of § 241, each amendment superseded the previous provision and removed the discriminatory taint associated with the original version.8. Because the motives of Mississippi's legislature and voters when § 241 was re-enacted are not impugned, and because § 241 now seeks only to penalize all criminals convicted of certain crimes, Hunter does not condemn § 241. 583, 42 L.Ed. at 1922. the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 865, 868 (Miss. See id. Rehabilitating Unconstitutional Statutes: An Analysis of Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. See Holly v. State, 671 So.2d 32, 45 (Miss. The Mississippi Constitution denies the ballot to any person "convicted of murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretenses, perjury, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy." He wants to vote and complains, via a § 1983 suit, that the appellees unconstitutionally disenfranchised him. For these reasons, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232-33, 105 S.Ct.

This appeal originally included both Keith Brown and Jarvious Cotton. Because Mississippi's procedure resulted both in 1950 and in 1968 in a re-enactment of § 241, each amendment superseded the previous provision and removed the discriminatory taint associated with the original version.